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This study shows that capital structure choices of US corporations are 
interdependent across time. We follow a two-step estimation approach. First, 
using a large cross-section of firms we estimate year-by-year average 
capital structure choices, i.e., the average firm’s percentage of new funding 
that is secured through debt, its term composition, and the percentage of 
new equity represented by retained earnings. Second, these time series are 
included in a Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive model in which three 
factors representing real economic activity, expected future funding 
conditions, and prices, are included. We test for the interdependence 
between optimal capital structure decisions and for the influence exerted by 
macroeconomic conditions on these decisions. Results show there is a 
hierarchical order in which firms make capital structure decisions. They first 
decide on the share of debt out of total new funding they will hire. 
Conditional on this they decide on the term of their debt and on their 
earnings retention policy. Of outmost importance, macroeconomic factors 
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Capital structure refers to the proportion of debt and equity employed by a firm to fund its 
operations and finance its assets. There are tradeoffs firms must make when they decide whether 
to use debt or equity to finance operations, and managers will balance the two to find the optimal 
capital structure, i.e., the capital structure that results in the lowest weighted average cost of capital 
for the firm. 
Understanding how firms fund their operations is a major topic in modern corporate finance. In 
practice, corporations raise funds from a variety of sources, e.g., issuing shares, contracting long- 
or short-term debt, and retaining earnings. An important question that has not been given sufficient 
attention in the literature is whether a firm’s capital structure decisions are interdependent and 
whether they are significantly influenced by the macroeconomic environment. In fact, empirical 
studies in corporate finance routinely examine firms’ financial policy decisions in isolation. For 
instance, decisions on how much short-term debt to issue as a proportion of total debt are assumed 
to be independent of the decision on the firm’s debt-to-capital ratio. This assumption that is 
frequently made in the literature, however, contrasts with the fact that in practice firms’ financing 
decisions are related by accounting identities. Changes in one control variable imply the adjustment 
of other control variables. Additionally, optimal capital structure decisions may depend on 
macroeconomic conditions. Access to banking credit, for instance, depends on the monetary policy 
stance and on the willingness of banks to extend loans to firms. 
This paper studies the interdependence of firms’ capital structure decisions and their relationship 
with the macroeconomic environment. By integrating a structural macroeconometric approach and 
a classical (microeconometric) regression framework supported on cash flow restrictions, causal 
relations between the three most important decisions about the funding mix are studied: i) issuing 
shares versus acquiring new debt, ii) increasing the relative size of short- versus long term debt 
and, iii) retaining earnings versus raising new equity. The interdependence between these three 
relevant decisions is studied within a dynamic framework in which the state of the economy and 
uncertainty about the future matter. 
Concretely, our empirical strategy consists of a two-step approach. First, using a large cross-section 
of firms we estimate year-by-year average capital structure choices, i.e., the average firm’s 
percentage of new funding that is secured through debt, its term composition of debt, and its 
percentage of new equity represented by retained earnings. Three time series are obtained. In the 
second step, these time series are included in a Factor Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) 
model in which three factors representing real economic activity, expected future funding 
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conditions, and prices, are included. For identifying causal relationships among our variables, we 
take advantage of a big-data approach in which almost natural contemporaneous exogeneity 
restrictions are imposed on the data generating process. This modeling approach, which is novel 
in this strand of the literature, allows studying both the interdependence between optimal capital 
structure decisions and the influence exerted by macroeconomic conditions on these decisions. 
Results show there is a hierarchical order in which firms make capital structure decisions, i.e., firms’ 
capital structure decisions are interdependent. They first decide on the share of debt out of total 
new funding they will hire. Importantly, this decision is considerably affected by the prevailing 
macroeconomic conditions. In turn, this decision significantly affects decisions on the term of the 
debt selection and on their earnings retention policy. Moreover, macroeconomic conditions also 
directly affect these two latter decisions. Notably, the decision on the term of the debt and the 
decision regarding dividends retention are independent of each other. 
Findings indicate the existence of a ‘pecking order’ effect or a hierarchy in the process of the 
optimal capital structure decision, reflected in the aggregate ratios that we estimate. However, as in 
the market timing theory, this hierarchy depends heavily on prevailing market and macroeconomic 
conditions. The existence of this hierarchy suggests that firms’ capital structure decisions must be 
considered jointly. Papers studying separately these three important decisions may obtain biased 
and inconsistent parameter estimates, as debt maturity decisions and earning retention policies 
depend on the debt-to-equity ratio decided by the firm, which in turn varies over time depending 
on the overall macroeconomic conditions. 
Besides identifying causal relations between firms’ capital structure decisions, our approach allows 
estimation of shock persistence between them and macroeconomic factors. We show the system’s 
dynamic responses to a variety of shocks, including perturbations to the macroeconomic 
conditions and to aggregate capital structure decisions. The FAVAR approach permits including a 
limited number of factors accounting for many macroeconomic variables which can influence 
firms’ capital structure choices. We use a big-data set of more than 200 series of macro-variables 
and identify three orthogonal factors capable of explaining a high percentage of their variance. 
Within this setup we impose plausible contemporaneous restrictions on the data generating 
process, which do not directly interfere with the hypotheses under study. In other words, our set 
of restrictions does not imply a particular hierarchy of capital structure decisions. Instead, we let 
the data speak as freely as possible. But, at the same time, we consider some identification problems 
that have been overlooked by the past literature attempting to assemble micro-leverage levels and 
macroeconomic factors (e.g., the possibility of reverse causality, omitted factors due to data 
sparsity, etc.). 
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The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review 
highlighting results produced by the main papers in the related literature. The third section 
describes the empirical methodology and explains the two-step estimation procedure implemented 
in this study. The fourth section presents the data and the construction of the factors and the 
FAVAR model. Section 5 shows the estimation results, and the last section concludes. 
2. Literature review and contribution  
The starting point in the optimal capital structure literature is the work by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) who show that in an ideal world without transaction costs, free of taxes and with perfectly 
efficient capital markets, the firm’s capital structure does not affect its value. This financial 
irrelevance theorem produced a heated debate in the corporate finance literature, focused on 
analyzing the implications of market frictions on firms’ capital structure. Indeed, when taxes, 
transaction costs, and information asymmetries are considered, the choice of financing sources 
gains relevance as it affects firms’ value, as shown by Fazzari et al. (1988). Different theories, 
namely the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory, and the market timing theory, explain the 
implications of such frictions on the firm’s capital structure and provide insights regarding its 
empirical determinants and the mechanisms through which they influence the choice of leverage 
levels and the earnings retention policy. 
According to the trade-off theory, capital structure is determined by a trade-off between the 
benefits and costs of debt. The tax-bankruptcy trade-off perspective, for instance, is that firms 
balance the tax benefits of debt against the deadweight costs of bankruptcy. The agency perspective 
focuses on the shareholder-manager versus shareholder-debtholder trade-off of debt. While 
increasing debt disciplines managers mitigating the former, at the same time it exacerbates the 
latter. 
The pecking-order model (Myers and Majluf, 1984) proposes that asymmetric information 
increases the cost of firms’ external sources of finance inducing a financial hierarchy. Firms prefer 
internal financing, the least costly alternative. Debt is the second preferred source and equity 
becomes their “last resort” source of financing. Equity is the least preferred source because when 
managers, who know better the firm’s condition that investors, issue new equity, investors believe 
that managers think the firm is overvalued and managers are taking advantage of this situation. In 
consequence, investors will place a lower value to the new equity. 
Finally, the market timing theory proposes that firms choose the form of financing which, at each 
point in time, seems to be more valued by financial markets. Hence, the capital structure depends 
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on financial market conditions which, in turn, depend on the more general macroeconomic 
conditions. 
Empirically, the capital structure literature has explored both the cross-sectional and time series 
determinants of firms’ capital structure. However, most effort has been devoted to identifying its 
main microeconomic determinants. In the presence of market frictions, the choice of financing 
sources is not trivial and involves relevant trade-offs. For instance, while debt-financing offers tax 
advantages, as interests are tax deductible, it also entails considerable disadvantages such as 
liquidation rights that can lead to financial costs in a default scenario. Various papers on this trade-
off have shown that the balance between advantages and disadvantages depends on firms’ 
characteristics such as their asset tangibility, size, liquidity, age of the firm, cash flow volatility, and 
the industry to which they belong.  
Over the last forty years a vast number of studies has analyzed the relationship between different 
firm characteristics and their funding sources, typically proxied by their debt ratios. Variables which 
have appeared to matter in most studies are cash flow volatility, size, asset tangibility, the market-
to-book ratio, profitability, stock returns, and industrial sector. For instance, a firm with highly 
volatile cash flows faces a higher probability of bankruptcy for a given level of debt. Then, the 
costs associated with debt-financing for these firms surpass their benefits, implying they tend to 
choose low debt-to-equity ratios. Hence, a negative relationship between cash flow volatility and 
leverage has been encountered by various papers in the literature (see, for instance, Bradley, 1984, 
Wald, 1999, and Bold et al., 2001). However, the opposite effect of cash flow volatility on debt-
financing has been found by Lary and Malitz (1985), Titmand and Wessels (1988), and Kale et al. 
(1992), among others. Recent papers have reconciled these opposing results by suggesting the 
existence of a non-monotonic relationship between cash flow volatility and the debt-to-equity ratio 
(Hovakimian, 2009). Size has also been widely identified as a relevant microeconomic determinant 
of a firm’s capital structure. Different channels explain this relationship. First, larger firms face 
lower refinancing costs and, therefore, exhibit higher leverage levels. Second, larger firms tend to 
be more diversified and exhibit less volatile cash flows, hence facing lower bankruptcy costs (Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995). 
A firm’s profitability has also been found to be a relevant predictor of its capital structure. As 
shown by Titman and Wessels (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1995), more profitable firms tend 
to have lower debt-to-capital ratios. However, opposite results have been reported by papers 
emphasizing on the fact that more profitable firms are subject to higher tax exposures, which may 
motivate the use of more debt to benefit from interest deductibility. 
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The market-to-book ratio has a negative relation with a firm’s debt ratio, as shown by Smith and 
Watts (1992), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Jung et al. (1996), Baker and Wurgler (2002), Frank and 
Goyal (2004), and Barclay et al. (2006). Different reasons have appeared explaining this result. First, 
firms facing important growth opportunities usually undergo higher long-term investment. 
Optimally, they tend to maintain a low leverage level in the present to use this financial slack for 
future investment. Second, as proposed by Baker and Wurgler (2002), firms with high market-to-
book ratios are overvalued, incentivizing the use of equity financing over debt. This intuition is the 
foundation of the market timing theory, which in addition to the trade-off and pecking order 
provides a theoretical benchmark to analyze optimal capital structure decisions. 
Stock market effects on firms’ capital structure have also been documented. Welch (2004) 
documents a negative and long-lasting relationship between a firm’s stock price and its debt ratio. 
Furthermore, the author finds that stock returns can explain about 40% of debt ratio dynamics and 
suggests that stock price effects are considerably more relevant in explaining debt-ratios than 
previously identified proxies (firms’ characteristics). 
Within the capital structure determinants, the literature has also considered the effect of the 
industrial sector of the firm on its funding decisions. Simerly and Li (2000) and Mackay and Phillips 
(2005) indicate that firms belonging to more dynamic and less predictable industries tend to issue 
less debt. Recent studies have explored other microeconomic determinants such as the age of the 
firm (Kieschnick and Moussawi, 2018), its family ownership structure (Diaz-Diaz et al., 2016), its 
geographical location and its executive compensation policies (Freund et al., 2018). 
However, Lemmon et al. (2008) challenges the widely accepted view that microeconomic 
characteristics are the main determinants of firms’ capital structure.  This study shows that leverage 
ratios present two outstanding features which cannot be explained by the well-established capital 
structure determinants mentioned above. The first feature is that leverage ratios tend to converge 
over time. Specifically, firms initially exhibiting high leverage rations tend to move toward lower 
leverage ratios over time. The second feature is related to the stable nature of leverage ratios in the 
long run. In consequence, leverage ratio dynamics are represented in this study by a transitory and 
a permanent component. Findings suggest that the permanent component accounts for most of 
the observed capital structure variation (60%), while traditional determinants explain a modest 
proportion of this variation (between 18% and 29%, depending on the model specification). The 
presence of a statistically significant unobserved and permanent component highlights the 
necessity of considering dynamic specifications and more creative identification strategies within 
capital structure analysis. 
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Country-level determinants have also been considered (Booth 2001, Bancel and Mittoo, 2004, and 
Antoniou et al., 2008). These studies compare funding decisions of firms from different countries 
including macro-variables such as the gross domestic product, the stock market development, and 
the level of investor protection. They highlight the relevance of the external environment on firms’ 
funding decisions (Kayo and Kimura, 2011). 
One channel through which the external environment plays a prominent role in firms’ funding 
decisions is by the dependence of firms’ cash flows on macroeconomic conditions. During good 
times in which the economy is rapidly expanding firms obtain higher cash flows reducing their 
dependence on external financing and reducing the costs of financing through higher access to 
debt markets. On the contrary, in times of output contraction firms’ cash flows are reduced, 
increasing their dependence on external funding sources. During contractions external sources of 
funding are more costly for firms as their access to debt markets is reduced (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1992). This interaction has been analyzed in the literature through the inclusion of macroeconomic 
variables in empirical specifications as in Korajczyk and Levy (2003), who consider three aggregate 
variables in addition to firm-specific determinants: the excess returns of commercial paper, the 
growth rate of corporate profits, and equity market returns. Their findings suggest that firms align 
their funding choices to coincide with favorable macroeconomic conditions and that leverage is 
counter-cyclical. The relationship between firms’ financing decisions and macroeconomic 
conditions is also theoretically analyzed by Hackbarth et al. (2006) through a contingent claims 
model of a levered firm. The leverage ratios generated by the model are like those observed in 
empirical studies. Additionally, the model predicts that firms’ leverage is counter-cyclical, as 
empirically reported by Korajczyk and Levy (2003).  
Frank and Goyal (2009) evaluate the relative importance of many factors in the capital structure of 
American firms. They include firm characteristics such as tangibility, profits, market-to-book ratio, 
and profits, and inflation as a macroeconomic indicator. Their results indicate that inflation 
increases leverage. 
The relationship between the capital structure and the macroeconomic context arises not only due 
to firms’ cash flow dynamics, but also due to more general debt market and macroeconomic 
dynamics. Uncertainty matters, and the willingness of borrowers and lenders to issue new debt are 
of utmost importance for the capital structure determination. In fact, Graham et al. (2015) show 
that the leverage ratios of American firms over the last 100 years cannot be explained solely by 
cross-sectional differences in firm characteristics. Macroeconomic variables play a predominant 
role in explaining observed capital structure differences over time. Similar results have been 
reported by Lemmon et al. (2008) and Kayo and Kimura (2011). These studies have augmented 
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the set of regressors into traditional microeconometric setups, including distinct macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP, government debt, exports, income tax rates, money supply, inflation, 
among others.  
A recent study by Chang et al. (2019) analyzes the influence of the business cycle on the capital 
structure by decomposing a set of macroeconomic variables using a principal components 
framework. Their empirical specifications also consider firms characteristics and firms’ fixed effects 
to control for time invariant factors that may influence firm financing decisions as in Lemmon et 
al. (2008). Their findings point out that macroeconomic principal components are responsible for 
a significant part of the time-series variation in the dependent variable (debt versus equity). 
Macroeconomic variables are especially relevant for financially constrained firms, indicating that 
macroeconomic factors interact with firm characteristics in determining the optimal capital 
structure over time. In a recent contribution Crouzet and Mehrotra (2020) show that the 1% of 
largest firms are less cyclically sensitive than the rest. Their findings indicate that differences in 
cyclicality do not derive from a differential access to financing but mainly from differences in the 
industry scope of the firms. 
While a handful of recent papers have shown that macroeconomic factors matter for capital 
structure decisions, the question remains on which macro-variables are to be included. Different 
papers propose different macroeconomic covariates. While one possible direction consists in 
including different sets of regressors and testing which of these sets provides more information, 
an alternative and more efficient way consists of using factor analysis to reduce many variables into 
fewer numbers of factors. This technique extracts maximum common variance from all variables 
and puts them into a common score. We follow this approach and use a big-data set of almost 250 
series of macro- and financial variables for the US economy identifying three orthogonal factors 
explaining a high percentage of their variance. 
Our methodological approach consists of two stages. In the first stage we use a large cross-section 
of firms for estimating year-by-year average capital structure choices obtaining three time series, 
one for the proportion of debt out of total financing, other for the proportion of short-term debt 
out of total debt, and one for the proportion of earnings retention out of total new equity, following 
the cash flow paired-regression framework put forward by Fama and French (2012) to aggregate 
capital structure decisions made by firms. In the second step, these time series are included in a 
FAVAR model in which factors representing real economic activity, expected future funding 
conditions, and prices, are included. This modeling approach, which is novel in this strand of the 
literature, allows studying both the interdependence between optimal capital structure decisions 
and the influence exerted by macroeconomic conditions on these decisions. 
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3. Methodology 
Our methodological approach consists of two steps. In the first step, firms’ capital structure 
decisions are analyzed using the analytical framework provided by Fama and French (2012). These 
authors put forward paired regressions that describe three different types of a firm’s financing 
decisions: i) the division of new outside financing between shares issued and debt, ii) the division 
of new debt obligations between short- and long-term, and iii) the division of new equity funding 
between shares issued and retained earnings. The regressions above are based on cash flow 
constraints that describe sources and uses of funds. Unlike Fama and French (2012) results here 
are reported, year-by-year instead of averaging them across time. In this way, time dynamics are 
considered for the aggregate of firms, and we end up with three time series representing the three 
aggregate decisions regarding capital structure of firms in the economy. In continuation, these time 
series of funding decisions serve as input, alongside three macroeconomic factors, to our 
multivariate time-series analysis, which is conducted via a Factor-Augmented Vector 
Autoregression (FAVAR) model and associated Impulse-Response Functions (IRF) and Forecast 
Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD) statistics. 
3.1. Cash flow regressions: Cross-sectional analysis 
i) Shares issued against debt 
Following Fama and French (2012) we start from the following cash flow constraint:  
𝑑𝑆 + 𝑑𝐿 = 𝑑𝐴 + 𝐷 − 𝑌  .                            (1) 
Equation 1 is used to construct pairs of regressions that describe the division of new outside 
financing. In Equation 1 𝑑𝑆  is the change in the book-value of common stocks issued during fiscal 
year t; 𝑑𝐿  is the change in liabilities, including preferred stocks, also on a yearly basis; 𝑑𝐴  is new 
total investment, defined as the yearly change in assets; 𝐷  stands for paid dividends and 𝑌  for 
earnings in year t. 𝑑 denotes a yearly change, which emphasizes that we are analyzing decisions 
made within a year, instead of cumulated effects of decisions made during several years. The pair-
regressions that we fit to the data in this case are:  
𝑑𝑆 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝑑𝐴 + 𝑏 𝐷 + 𝑏 𝑌 + 𝑒 ,                             (2) 
𝑑𝐿 = 𝑎∗ + 𝑏∗𝑑𝐴 + 𝑏∗𝐷 + 𝑏∗𝑌 + 𝑒∗ .                           (3) 
The coefficients of the second regression are restricted by the cash flow identity, so that 𝑎∗ = −𝑎, 
𝑏∗ = (1 − 𝑏 ) , 𝑏∗ = (1 − 𝑏 ) , and 𝑏∗ = (1 + 𝑏 ) . In particular, the coefficient before the 
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change in assets (investment) represents the division between the two funding options: shares or 
debt.   
ii) Division of new debt financing between short- and long-term obligations 
In this case, we use the following cash flow constraint:  
𝑑𝑆𝑇𝐷 + 𝑑𝐿𝑇𝐷 = 𝑑𝐴 + 𝐷 − 𝑌 − 𝑑𝑆 ,                         (4) 
where 𝑑𝑆𝑇𝐷  is the change in short-term debt obligations, which consists of the variation in 
current liabilities during year t. 𝑑𝐿𝑇𝐷  is the change in long-term debt for year t, constructed as the 
residual of total minus current liabilities.  𝑑𝑆  is the change in outstanding shares in year t. 
According to (4), we can fit the following paired-regressions to the data:  
𝑑𝑆𝑇𝐷 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝑑𝐴 + 𝑏 𝐷 + 𝑏 𝑌 + 𝑏 𝑆 +𝑒 ,                            (5) 
𝑑𝐿𝑇𝐷 =  𝑎∗ + 𝑏∗𝑑𝐴 + 𝑏∗𝐷 + 𝑏∗𝑌 + 𝑏∗𝑑𝑆 + 𝑒∗,                     (6) 
where the coefficients associated to variables 𝑑𝐴 , 𝐷 , 𝑌 , and 𝑑𝑆  in equations (5) and (6) indicate 
how, on average for the population of firms, these variables are divided between short- and long-
term financing. Again we have that 𝑎∗ = −𝑎, 𝑏∗ = (1 − 𝑏 ), 𝑏∗ = (1 − 𝑏 ), and 𝑏∗ = (1 + 𝑏 ), 
𝑏∗ = (1 + 𝑏 ). 
iii) Shares issued and retained earnings 
A third pair of complementary regressions is presented in what follows. In this case, given that a 
firm cannot freely choose earnings, the analysis of retained earnings is conducted through the 
analysis of dividends: 
𝑑𝑆 − 𝐷 = 𝑑𝐴 − 𝑌 − 𝑑𝐿          .                              (7) 
The third cash flow constraint in 7 states that the part of investment that is not financed by earnings 
or new debt must be financed through net share issuance, which corresponds to shares issued 
minus dividends. In this case the pair regressions fitted to the data are: 
𝐷 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 𝑑𝐴 + 𝑏 𝑑𝐿 + 𝑏 𝑌 + 𝑒 ,    (8) 
𝑑𝑆 = 𝑎∗ + 𝑏∗𝑑𝐴 + 𝑏∗𝑑𝐿 + 𝑏∗𝑌 + 𝑒∗.    (9) 
We have that 𝑎∗ = 𝑎, 𝑏∗ = (𝑏 − 1), 𝑏∗ = (𝑏 + 1), and 𝑏∗ = (𝑏 + 1) and the interpretation 
of the associated coefficients remain as before.  
3.2. Factor augmented vector autoregression: Time series analysis 
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We follow Bernanke et al. (2005) who proposed FAVAR models, seeking to overcome two 
important drawbacks of the original VAR framework. Namely, traditional VARs are unable to 
consider large sets of information due to the curse of dimensionality, and the indicators included 
in the model are always arbitrarily selected from a potentially large pool of candidates. These two 
reasons make traditional VARs prone to biases emerging from omitting confounded variations and 
measurement error. A traditional VAR is given by: 
𝑌 = 𝐴(𝐿)𝑌 + 𝑒 ,     (10) 
𝑌   is a (𝑀 × 1) vector of 𝑀 variables, 𝐴(𝐿) is a polynomial in the lag-operator of order d, 𝑒   is a 
vector of multivariate white noise perturbations. 𝑌  consists of three cash flow variables describing 
firms’ aggregate financing decisions for the US economy, constructed as described in subsection 
3.1. To this specification we add 𝐹 , which is a 𝐾 × 1 vector of ‘factors’ that contains unobservable 
shocks that comprehensively describe the macroeconomic environment in which firms’ make their 






+ 𝑉 ,    (11) 
where 𝑉  is a vector of errors with zero-mean and variance-covariance matrix 𝑄.  
The model presented in equation (11) corresponds to a factor-augmented VAR, but unlike 
FAVARs in the previous literature, our factors do not come from data on capital structure 
decisions, but from an external big-data set that consists of 248 series describing the US economy, 
which are provided by McCracken and Ng (2020). This big-data set includes information on 
production, employment, interest rates, prices, housing, earnings, stock markets, money and credit, 
among others. We estimated 𝐹  by Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and include only the first 
3 components in Equation 11. The cardinality of the factors, 𝐾, is set according to the criterion 
proposed by Bai and Ng (2007) to determine the number of dynamic or primitive factors in large 
panels.  







+ 𝑅(𝐿)𝑉 ,    (12) 
𝐹  and 𝑌  are unconditional means and 𝑅(𝐿) is a polynomial in the lag operator of infinite lag 
order. Structural innovations can be recovered from the system in equation (12) imposing 
theoretical restrictions on the VAR representation. In particular if 𝐵 contains as many theoretical 
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restrictions as needed to identify the system, then  𝐵 𝑉  = 𝜀 , and therefore, 𝑅(𝐿) 𝐵 = Φ(𝐿), 
where 𝜀  is a (𝑀 + 𝐾) × 1 vector of structural innovations and Φ(𝐿) are structural IRFs of the 






+ Φ(𝐿)𝜀  .    (13) 
Sims (1980) proposes to fully identify the system by assuming a triangular matrix 𝐵. However, in 
practice, 𝐵 is not required to be triangular, as far as the number of restrictions on it, which describe 
the contemporaneous relations between the variables in the system, is high enough (i.e. the number 
of zeros is the same as in the corresponding triangular matrix). In our particular case we use the 
following 𝐵 matrix:  
 𝑺𝒕 𝑺𝑻𝑫𝒕 𝑫𝒕 𝒇𝟏 𝒇𝟐 𝒇𝟑 
𝑺𝒕 1 𝑏  𝑏  𝑏  𝑏  𝑏  
𝑺𝑻𝑫𝒕 𝑏  1 𝑏  𝑏  𝑏  𝑏  
𝑫𝒕 𝑏  𝑏  1 𝑏  𝑏  𝑏  
𝒇𝟏 0 0 0 1 0 0 
𝒇𝟐 0 0 0 0 1 0 
𝒇𝟑 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Where S  stands for the proportion of shares issued (versus debt), STD  is the participation of 
short-term debt in the total, and D  are retained earnings. 𝐵  exploits that macroeconomic 
conditions exert a contemporaneous impact on funding decisions of firms, but the latter are only 
allowed to affect the macroeconomy with a lag (which accounts for the zeros in the first three 
columns of 𝐵). Also we have that by construction (i.e. PCA estimation), the three macroeconomic 
factors are contemporaneously exogenous with respect to each other (which explains the zeros in 
the last three columns of 𝐵). The system representation in Equation 13 and the matrix 𝐵 allows 




The cash flow data used in our regressions were retrieved from Compustat. Our sample runs from 
1963 to 2018 and it has a yearly frequency. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the cash flow 
variables included in our regressions from 1963 to 2018. All variables in the table are divided by 
assets at the end of fiscal year t, and multiplied by 100. We exclude firms lacking information about 
any of the variables in a given year. To construct the table we first estimate yearly means, standard 
deviations (s.d.) and skewness (skew.) and then we average across time. The number of firms for 
which we have complete information in each year varies considerably, from 502 in 1963 to 3653 
in 2018, with a minimum of 502 and a maximum of 6294 (observed in 1996). We trimmed our 
annual samples, deleting 0.5% left-tail observations of the variable 𝑑𝐴  to avoid the influence of 
outliers in our OLS regressions as recommended by Fama and French (2012). 
Table 1. Variable Description: Capital Structure Choices 
  dAt dSt dLt dSTDt dLTDt Yt Dt 
Average 8.48 5.11 3.77 2.19 1.58 0.89 1.29 
Average s.d. 23.14 20.08 20.75 14.40 17.18 17.58 4.41 
Average skew. -0.14 5.98 -1.94 -1.40 -2.03 -1.92 16.28 
Note: Data retrieved from Conpustat from 1963 to 2018. 
In Table 1 𝑑𝑆  is the change in the book value of common stocks issued during fiscal year t; 𝑑𝐿  
is the change in liabilities, including preferred stocks, also on a yearly basis; 𝑑𝐴  is new total 
investment, defined as the yearly change in assets; 𝐷  stands for paid dividends, 𝑌  is earnings in a 
year, 𝑑𝑆𝑇𝐷  is the change in short-term debt obligations, which consists of the variation in current 
liabilities during year t, 𝑑𝐿𝑇𝐷  is the change in long-term debt for year t, constructed as the residual 
of total minus current liabilities and 𝑑𝐶𝑆𝑇  is the change in common equity. A more detailed 
description of each variable is provided in the Appendix. 
The information to construct the factors is publicly available on the website of the Federal Reserve 
of Bank of St. Louis, it consists of 248 series for 14 groups of variables regarding production, 
employment, inventories, housing, sales, orders, earnings, interest rates, prices, balance sheets of 
households and non-households, exchange rates and stock markets, among others, from 1963:Q1 
to 2020:Q1. The detailed description of the variables can be found in McCracken and Ng (2020) 
alongside the transformations applied to the series to achieve stationarity. We follow the advice of 
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these authors to deal with missing observations and outliers before estimation of the factors. Thus, 
our factors correspond with those reported by McCracken and Ng (2020). 
5. Empirical Results 
As stated in the methodology, to evaluate the interdependence between the firm’s capital structure 
decisions and to test for the effect of the macroeconomic environment on these decisions we 
follow a two-step approach. The first step consists of year-by-year cross-sectional regressions using 
firm-level data. Capital structure decisions for the average firm are obtained from these regressions. 
We find per-year values for the percentage of new funding that is secured through debt, the 
percentage of short-term debt out of total debt, and the percentage of newly issued equity 
represented by retained earnings. In the second step these time series are standardized (to allow 
comparisons of the effects) and included in a FAVAR model in which our three estimated factors 
standing for real economic activity, expected future funding conditions, and prices, are included. 
Figure 1 shows first step results. The top left panel shows the average firm’s percentage of new 
debt (shares) with respect to total new financing. Notably, as financial markets have evolved over 
time, firms have increased their financing with share issuance. While the average debt-to-equity 
ratio for the period 1963 – 1982 was 5.5, its average from 1983 to 2018 was only 1.1. High time-
variation in this ratio is observed, however, especially during the last two decades, with lowest 
values registered in times of financial turmoil. 
The proportion of short-term debt out of total debt (top right panel in Figure 1) shows an upward 
trend. This result coincides with those of Custódio et al. (2013) who show that corporate use of 
long-term debt has decreased in the US over the past three decades, especially for small firms. The 
decrease in debt maturity was generated mainly by firms with higher information asymmetry and 
new firms issuing public equity in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Regarding new equity issuance (bottom panel of Figure 1), most is attained through new shares 
(over 80% in every tear from 1963 to 2018), and an increasing trend is observed during the sample 




Figure 1 Capital Structure Choices 
Panel A: New Shares vs. New Debt Panel B. Short- vs. Long- Term Debt 
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Panel C. Dividends vs. New Shares 
  
Note: Panel A presents results of complementary regressions for 𝑑𝑆  and 𝑑𝐿 . It shows the proportion of yearly 
new investment (dAt) financed through issues of new shares (black line) and new outside financing (red line). 
Panel B presents results of complementary regressions for 𝑑𝑆𝑇𝐷  and 𝑑𝐿𝐷𝑇 . The panel shows the proportion 
of new yearly investment financed through short-term-debt (black line) and long-term-debt (red line). Panel C 
presents results of complementary regressions for 𝑑𝐷  and 𝑑𝑆 . This panel shows the proportion of new yearly 
investment (financed through retained earnings (black line) and new share issues (red line). The sample runs from 
1963 to 2018. We trimmed our annual samples, deleting 0.5% left-tail observations of the variable 𝑑𝐴  to avoid 
the influence of outliers.  
The time series on capital structure decisions constructed in the first step of our empirical 
procedure are included in a FAVAR model in the second step. Besides these three variables, 
the FAVAR model includes three factors that determine the dynamics of the US economy 
from 1959 to 2019. These three factors explain roughly 35% of total variability in the set of 
248 macro-variables, as shown in Figure 2. 































Note: The figure shows the first main factors that determine the dynamics of the US economy from 1959 
to 2019. The factors were estimated as the six first principal components of a large data set provided by 
McCracken and Ng (2020). The set consists of 248 quarterly series from 1959:Q2 to 2020:Q1, is 
comprehensive, and includes subcategories like production, employment, interest rates, prices, housing, 
earnings, stock markets, money and credit, etc. for the US economy. The first factor explains 20% of the 
total variability in the macroeconomic big-data set, the second factor explains 8.3%, and the third factor 
7.3%. 
These three factors can be intuitively associated with distinct aspects of the macroeconomic 
environment, as shown in Table 2. Particularly, the first factor corresponds to real economic 
activity, the second to forward looking funding conditions, and the third factor to prices. 
Figure 3 graphically presents time series for these three factors. Note, for instance, that the 
real economic activity factor shows minimum values around episodes of economic depression 
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Factor 1: Real Economic Activity 
All Employees: Total Private Industries  USPRIV 83.5% 
Manufacturing Sector: Real Output  OUTMS 80.9% 
All Employees: Goods-Producing Industries  USGOOD 80.9% 
All Employees: Total nonfarm PAYEMS 80.8% 
Industrial Production: Manufacturing (SIC) IPMANSICS 79.8% 
Industrial Production Index INDPRO 78.5% 
Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons HOANBS 77.3% 
All Employees: Manufacturing MANEMP 76.7% 
Civilian Unemployment Rate UNRATE 76.5% 
All Employees: Durable goods DMANEMP 75.6% 
Factor 2: Forward Looking Funding Conditions 
Moody’s Aaa Corporate Bond Minus Federal Funds Rate AAAFFM 49.8% 
5-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Minus Federal Funds 
Rate T5YFFM 46.4% 
New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building 
Permits PERMIT 46.2% 
Total Business Inventories BUSINVx 43.0% 
Total: New Privately Owned Housing Units Started  HOUST 42.0% 
New Private Housing Units Authorized by Building 
Permits PERMITS 40.5% 
Capacity Utilization: Total Industry TCU 39.8% 
S&P’s Composite Common Stock: Dividend Yield S&P div yield 39.4% 
10-Year Treasury Minus 3-Month Treasury Bill GS10TB3Mx 36.3% 
3-Month Commercial Paper Minus 3-Month Treasury Bill CPF3MTB3Mx 36.0% 
Factor 3: Prices 
Consumer Price Index Less Shelter CUSR0000SA0L2 75.3% 
Consumer Price Index: Commodities CUSR0000SAC 73.8% 
Personal consumption expenditures: Goods DGDSRG3Q086SBEA 73.4% 
Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price 
Index PCECTPI 71.9% 
Consumer Price Index: Transportation CPITRNSL 70.4% 
Personal consumption expenditures: Nondurable good DNDGRG3Q086SBEA 69.4% 
Consumer Price Index Less Medical CUSR0000SA0L5 67.5% 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All 
Items CPIAUCSL 66.8% 
Producer Price Index by Commodity Intermediate 
Materials WPSID61 64.6% 
Consumer Price Index Less Food CPIULFSL 63.3% 
Note: The table shows the series with the larger factor loads at each of the three factors joint with the marginal 
R-squared of each factor on each series. The first factor captures the dynamics of production and unemployment 
so is regarded as economic activity; the second factor is related to several forward-looking variables, mainly 
interest rates, yields and housing activity, so we interpret it as a broadly defined funding or liquidity factor. Finally, 
the third factor is clearly related with prices. 
Figure 3 Big-Data Macro-Factors 
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Panel A: Factor 1 
 
Panel B. Factor 2 
 
Panel C. Factor 3 
  
Note: The figure shows the three main factors that determine the dynamics of the US economy from 1959 to 2019. 
The factors were estimated as the three first principal components of a large data set provided by McCracken and Ng 
(2020). The set consists of quarterly series from 1959: Q2 to 2020: Q1, is comprehensive, and includes subcategories 
like production, employment, interest rates, prices, housing, earnings, stock markets, money and credit, etc. for the US 
economy. We took the value of the factors recorded in the fourth quarter as our annual estimate (plotted then on the 
figure). The shadowed areas in each subplot correspond to recessions as indicated by a probability of recession greater 
than 0.5 at a given quarter, also extracted from the web page of the St. Louis Fed. 
Figure 4 presents FEVD results for the three capital structure decisions. The variance 
decomposition indicates the amount of information each variable contributes to the other variables 
in the FAVAR model. In other words, it determines how much of the forecast error variance of 
each of the variables can be explained by exogenous shocks to the other variables. As expected, 
autoregressive components are very important. Panel A shows that over 60% of the forecast error 
variance of the proportion of shares out of total new financing is explained by its autoregressive 
component. The remaining 40% is explained by macroeconomic factors. This is an important 
result, highlighting the relevance of macroeconomic conditions, especially real economic activity 
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how much equity to issue and how much new debt to contract. This result is like those obtained 
by Kayo and Kimura (2011), who show that time-determinants, i.e., those associated with the 
macroeconomic environment, are more important than firm-, industry-, and country-level 
determinants of firm leverage. Capital structure composition depends on various aspects of the 
macroeconomic environment, including the level of economic activity, the willingness of creditors 
to extend credit, and creditors’ and debtors’ expectations about future economic and financial 
conditions. Notably, the decisions on term composition of new debt and on earnings retention do 
not affect the decision on the proportion of equity. 
Panels B and C show a different story for the term-composition of debt and the earnings retention 
policy, respectively. These two decisions are also influenced by the macroeconomic environment. 
In fact, the effect of real economic activity and expected funding conditions increases on the 
forecast horizon. However, the debt-to-equity ratio decided by the firm affects these two decisions 
considerably. In fact, approximately ten quarters ahead, around 40% of the forecast error variance 
of these two variables is explained by the debt-to-equity ratio decision. 
This important result illustrates there is a hierarchical interdependence between a firm’s capital 
structure decisions. Our results go in line with the predictions of the theoretical model developed 
by Gatchev et al. (2010), showing that static models of financial decisions produce inconsistent 
coefficient estimates, and that models ignoring the interdependence between decision variables 
lead to misleading conclusions regarding optimal capital structure choices made by firms. The 
proportion of short-term debt issued and the decision to retain earnings significantly depend on 
the decision of how much new debt to issue. It also suggests that papers ignoring this hierarchical 
decision process obtain biased and inconsistent estimates of the effects of distinct firm-specific 
variables on their capital structure composition.  
Our results confirm the findings reported by Graham et al. (2015), who show that changes in 
government borrowing, macroeconomic uncertainty, and financial sector development play the 
major role in explaining differences in firm leverage and capital structure decisions during the 
twentieth century. Cross-sectional differences among firms and changing firm characteristics are 
unable to account for the change in firm leverage patterns observed over the last 100 years. 
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Figure 4. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
Panel A: Shared Issues Panel B: Short Term Debt 






Note: The figure shows the forecast error variance decomposition for the FAVAR (1) system estimated using the three 
capital structure choices by US firms and the three main factors for the US economy. The FEVD for the factors is 
presented in the online Appendix. 
Figures 5, 6 and 7 present impulse response functions showing the response of the six variables 
included in the system to shocks in each of the three capital structure variables included in the 
FAVAR model. The behavior of these dynamic multipliers confirms the main results described 
above. As shown in Figure 5, the share of short-term debt is significantly reduced from the first to 
the sixth quarter after a shock to the proportion of equity occurs. In other words, increases in the 
proportion of debt lead to increases in the proportion of short-term debt hired by firms. This 
result, which goes in line with those of Custódio et al. (2013), shows that increases in the debt-to-








increased exposure of firms to credit and liquidity shocks. As expected, the three macroeconomic 
factors are unaffected by corporate capital structure decisions. 
Figure 5. Impulse Response Function: Shock to Shared Issues 
 
Note: IRF to the Structural VAR system of 6 variables, from a shock to Shared Issues with a horizon of 15 
years. The axes and the shock are measured in standard deviations of the normalized variables. The estimation 
period runs from 1963:Q4 to 2018:Q4. Confidence bands (84%) are calculated using bootstrapping techniques 
as explained in Efron and Tibshirani (1993). The macroeconomic indicators: Activity, Funding and Prices are 
assumed as contemporaneously exogenous and the three capital structures choices by firms, namely the 
indicators of the proportion of: Shared Issues, Short-Term Debt and Retained Dividends are assumed as 
contemporaneously endogenous. All the variables become endogenous after the first year thanks to the VAR 
dynamics. 
Figures 6 and 7, in contrast, show that the debt-to-equity ratio does not respond to shocks in either 
the proportion of short-term debt or the proportion of new equity issued by the firm. Additionally, 
these two decisions are independent, as neither the proportion of short-term debt responds to the 
proportion of new equity issued, nor vice versa. Thus, all results support the finding that there is a 
unique hierarchical ordering in the capital structure decision process. 
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Figure 6. Impulse Response Function: Shock to Short Term Debt 
 
Note: IRF to the Structural VAR system of 6 variables, from a shock to Short Term Debt with a horizon of 15 
years. The axes and the shock are measured in standard deviations of the normalized variables. The estimation 
period runs from 1963:Q4 to 2018:Q4. Confidence bands (84%) are calculated using bootstrapping techniques 
as explained in Efron and Tibshirani (1993). The macroeconomic indicators: Activity, Funding and Prices are 
assumed as contemporaneously exogenous and the three capital structures choices by firms, namely the 
indicators of the proportion of: Shared Issues, Short-Term Debt and Retained Dividends are assumed as 





Figure 7. Impulse Response Function: Shock to Retained Dividends 
 
Note: IRF to the Structural VAR system of 6 variables, from a shock to retained Dividends with a horizon of 
15 years. The axes and the shock are measured in standard deviations of the normalized variables. The 
estimation period runs from 1963:Q4 to 2018:Q4. Confidence bands (84%) are calculated using bootstrapping 
techniques as explained in Efron and Tibshirani (1993). The macroeconomic indicators: Activity, Funding and 
Prices are assumed as contemporaneously exogenous and the three capital structures choices by firms, namely 
the indicators of the proportion of: Shared Issues, Short-Term Debt and Retained Dividends are assumed as 
contemporaneously endogenous. All the variables become endogenous after the first year thanks to the VAR 
dynamics. 
The literature on microeconomic determinants of the capital structure has insisted in some key 
characteristics affecting it. One important determinant of capital structure decisions is firm size. 
To test for the firm size effect in our setup, we performed two additional sets of estimations. In 
the first, the two-step procedure described above was applied to the average firm within the 25% 
smallest firms in the sample. In the second the same procedure was applied to the 25% largest 
firms in the sample. Results are qualitatively identical, as shown by forecast variance error 
decomposition results presented in figures 8 and 9, respectively. 
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Figure 8. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for 25% smallest firms 
Panel A: Shared Issues 
 
Panel B: Short Term Debt 
 
Panel C: Retained Dividends 
           
Note: The figure shows the forecast error variance decomposition for the VAR (1) system estimated using the three 
capital structure choices by US firms and the three main factors for the US economy. The FEVD for the factors is 










Figure 9. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for 25% largest firms 
Panel A: Shared Issues 
 
Panel B: Short Term Debt 
 
Panel C: Retained Dividends  
Note: The figure shows the forecast error variance decomposition for the VAR (1) system estimated using the three 
capital structure choices by US firms and the three main factors for the US economy. The FEVD for the factors is 
presented in the online Appendix. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper studies the interdependence between aggregate firms’ capital structure decisions and 
the influence that macroeconomic factors exert on these decisions. We design a two-step empirical 
strategy combining a classical microeconometric approach based on cash flow constraints with a 
novel macroeconometric model. In the first step year-by-year regressions are performed to estimate 
the debt-to-equity ratio, the proportion of short-term debt, and the percentage of new share 








step we include the time series obtained in the first step into a FAVAR model in which three factors 
representing real economic activity, expected future funding conditions, and prices, are also 
included. Factors are estimated using a large dataset comprising 248 macroeconomic variables. The 
three factors used in our empirical model can be associated with real economic activity, expected 
future funding conditions, and prices. By imposing natural contemporaneous exogeneity 
restrictions on the FAVAR model, we study both the interdependence between optimal capital 
structure decisions and the influence exerted by macroeconomic conditions on these decisions. 
Results show that, contrary to what is conventionally assumed in the related literature, firm capital 
structure decisions are interdependent and follow a hierarchical order. Firms decide first the 
optimal share of debt out of total new funding they will hire. This decision depends heavily on 
macroeconomic conditions, especially on real economic activity and on future expected funding 
conditions. Then, depending on the debt-to-equity ratio selected by the firm, decisions on short-
term debt composition and on earnings retention are taken. These two decisions, which are 
independent from each other, depend also directly on the macroeconomic environment. 
Our findings therefore suggest the existence of a ‘pecking order’ effect in the process of the optimal 
capital structure decision. However, as in the market timing theory, this hierarchy depends on 
prevailing market and macroeconomic conditions. Firms’ capital structure decisions are not 
independent from each other and must therefore be jointly modeled. Papers studying separately 
these three important decisions may obtain biased and inconsistent parameter estimates, as debt 
maturity decisions and earning retention policies depend on the debt-to-equity ratio decided by the 
firm, in turn varies over time depending on the overall macroeconomic conditions. 
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Our data are from Compustat. All variables are divided by assets at the end of fiscal year t, and 
multiplied by 100. The variables we use in the regressions for year t (traditional Compustat item 
numbers in parentheses) are:  
dAt  Investment: Change in assets (6) during fiscal year t.  
Yt  Earnings: Income before extraordinary items available for common (237) plus 
extraordinary income (48) during fiscal year t.  
dCSTt  Change in common equity (Compustat data item 60).  
Dt  Dividends: Dividends per share by ex-date (26) at the end of fiscal year t times shares 
outstanding (25) at the end of t.  
 30
dSt  Book value of shares issued: Change in common equity (Compustat data item 60) plus 
dividends, Dt , minus earnings, Yt , during fiscal year t.  
dLt  Change in total liabilities, including preferred: Change in assets (6) minus change in 
common equity (60) during fiscal year t.  
dSTDt  Change in short-term debt: Change in current liabilities (5) during fiscal year t.  
dLTDt  Change in long-term debt: Change in total liabilities, dLt , minus change in current liabilities, 
dSTDt .  
We exclude financial firms (Standard Industrial Classification codes between 6000 and 6999). We 
exclude firms that lack information about any of the variables in a given year. We also exclude 
firms from the regressions for year t if we are missing: Compustat shares outstanding, income 
before extraordinary items available for common, and extraordinary income for the fiscal year 
ending in t; assets, common equity, and current liabilities for the fiscal yearends in calendar years t 
-1 and t; and book equity for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1. Finally, we exclude firms 
whose common equity at the end of year t-1 exceeds their assets at the end of t -1.  
 
